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I. -STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Robert Ervin Peterson appeals from the district court's Order Dismissin'.;) Petiton 
for Post Conviction Relief filed June 17, 2013 (R., pp. 229 - 235) and the Order Denying 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment filed August 16, 2013 (R., pp. 261). Mr. Peterson 
further appeals the District Court's Order denying his Motion for Reconsider, said Order 
filed August 15, 2013 (R., pp. 231-233 Mr. Peterson asserts that the district court erred 
by summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and by failing to alter or 
amend its dismissal. 
B. Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Peterson's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Peterson's 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief without findings of fact and 
conclusions of law after evidentiary hearing? 
Ill. ARGUMENT 
A. 
A. The District Court Erred when it summarily dismissed Mr. Peterson's Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief without entering findings of fact and conclusions of 
law after evidentiary hearing. 
As stated in Mr. Peterson's opening brief. summary dismissal of an application is 
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permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material 
fact which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be 
conducted. Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517,518,960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998); Cowgerv. 
State, 132 Idaho 681,684,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999); Gonzales v. State, 120 
Idaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Thus, the court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on 
the pleading, deposition, and admissions together with any affidavits on file. Rhoades v. 
State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009); Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 
896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct. App. 1993). 
However, when an evidentiary hearing has been held, findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are required. IRCP 52(a). 
Also as stated in Mr. Peterson's opening brief, when the court sits as a trier of fact, 
it is charged with the duty of preparing findings of fact and conclusions of law in support 
of the decision it reaches. Pope v. lntermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 225, 646 
P.2d 988 (1982). It must be re-stated that the purpose of requiring the court to find the 
facts specially and state conclusions separately upon those facts is to provide the 
appellate court a clear understanding of the court's decision, so that it can be 
determined whether the trial court applied the proper law to appropriate facts. Id. 
Because this matter was tried via evidentiary hearing, and because therefore the 
district court sat as the trier of fact, the district court erred when it instead summarily 
dismissed Mr. Peterson's claims in his petition without addressing the facts presented in 
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any fashion. 
As noted above, In this case, the district court failed to make any findings of fact, 
despite having held a hearing and taken evidence. Further, the district court did not 
analyze the evidence presented but simply summarily dismissed the petition. As a 
consequence, the district court's error prevents the proper review of this case on 
appeal. 
Further the respondent did not address the contentions that the appellate court 
may disregard the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law only where the 
record is so clear as to give the appellate court a complete understanding of the 
material issues, and gives an obvious answer to a relevant question. Pope, 103 Idaho 
at 225, 646 P.2d at __ . Here, there was testimony from both petitioner, and 
contradictory testimony from the petitioner's trial attorney, on all the issues raised in the 
petition. No clear answers appear without weighing the credibility of the witnesses. 
When a case has been tried to a court, it is the province of the trial court, sitting as the 
finder of fact, to weigh the conflicting evidence and testimony and judge the credibility of 
the witnesses. Magic Valley Truck Brokers, Inc. v. Meyer, 133 Idaho 110, 114, 982 
P.2d 945 (Ct. App. 1999). 
B. 
Therefore, the summary dismissal was in error and must be reversed. 
The State's Motion for Summary Disposition was untimely and could not be 
relied upon as a basis for summary disposition. 
On May 20, 2013, the State filed its motion for summary dismissal, despite the 
fact that an evidentiary hearing had occurred on March 20, 2013 and evidence had 
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been taken via testimony, exhibit and judicial notice. (R., pp. 179-180). 
As stated in Mr. Peterson's prior briefing, a petition for post-conviction relief 
under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA) is a civil action in nature. 
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007). Idaho Code§ 19-
4907 states in pertinent part that "[a]II rules and stuates applicable in civil proceedings 
including pre-trial, discovery and appellate procedures are available to the parties." 
IRCP 56(b) stated at the time that a motion for summary judgment must be filed at least 
60 days prior to trial. 
As noted previously, the State's motion for summary disposition was not filed 
until approximately 60 days after trial to the finder of fact, the district court. Therefore, 
the motion was untimely and did not provide a basis upon which to enter summary 
disposition. The State contends that the district court may order different timelines if it 
chooses to. However, the court did not enter such and order. It simply ruled and 
entered summary disposition despite the existence of testimony and evidence that 
required findings and conclusions. 
C. The District Court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. Peterson's petition after 
hearing. 
Respondent incorrectly states that Mr. Peterson does not contest the district 
court's summary dismissal of his petition. (See Respondent's brief psge 5). Mr. 
Peterson specifically noted the standards for entering a summary dismissal, and review 
of said dismissal, on pages three and four of his opening brief. He also notes that 
testimony and other evidence was presented in support of his contentions on pages one 
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and two of his opening brief. 
prevail on an ineffective counsel claim in a post-conviction action, 
one must show that his or her attorney's performance was deficient, and that he or she 
was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); 
Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App. 1995). To establish 
deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that the attorney's representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 
760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Suits v. State, 143 Idaho 160, 162, 139 P.3d 762, 
764 (Ct. App. 2006). To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable 
probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial 
would have been different. Id. 
In the evidentiary hearing, and in his verified petition and affidavit in facts in 
support of petition, Mr. Peterson presented facts concerning how he was not advised 
that he could have press and others removed from the court room. Petitioner testified 
that he was not notified of said right, even after making specific inquiry about publicity 
and what efforts could be made to shield him from such inquiry. (Tr. p. 22, L.21 - p. 33, 
L.21.) 
Mr. Peterson testified that at the hearing a multitude of law enforcement officers, 
as well as many media outlets, complete with video cameras, and the like, were present 
at the preliminary hearing as the case received heavy media attention. (Tr. p. 22, L.21 -
p. 33, L.21.) These factors caused Mr. Peterson to waive his preliminary hearing when 
he would not of otherwise. Mr. Peterson contends that his counsel's performance was 
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ineffective under the relevant law cited above, and that he was thereby prejudiced. 
Based on the facts presented in evidence, the district court should not have summarily 
dismissed. 
Likewise, Mr. Peterson submitted evidence regarding not being informed of his 
rights under Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149. P.3d 833 (2006). Mr. Peterson 
testified that his attorney never advised him of his rights under that statute, and that 
nonetheless, the psychosexual evaluation performed was considered. (Tr. p. 43, L.12 -
p. 47, L.17.) Also, the exhibits entered into evidence demonstrated that Judge 
McDermott was convinced that the defendant's rights had been violated and that he was 
entitled to a new sentencing. (See, Tr. p. 45, L.23 - p. 46, L.23.). Therefore, Mr. 
Peterson provided ample evidence of his counsel's failures in that regard. Summary 
disposition was inappropriate. 
Similarly, Mr. Peterson contends that his counsel's performance was so deficient 
that his plea was not entered voluntarily. He supported said contention with evidence at 
hearing. (Tr. p. 40, L.7 - p. 41, L.7; p. 53, L.1 - p. 54, L.19.) 
First, Mr. Peterson testified he was not properly advised of his choices in regards 
to the crime with which he was charged. Mr. Peterson argues, and testified at hearing, 
that had he been advised of the elements of the offense which the State should have 
been required to prove, he would not have entered a guilty plea. 
Second, the plea was not voluntarily entered because even had petitioner been 
correctly advised of his choices, his trial counsel threatened him with adverse action if 
he refused to plead guilty. Counsel indicated to him, in anger, that counsel would not 
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only withdraw from his representation if he did not enter a guilty plea, but also that he 
would "blackball" the defendant, in a matter of speaking, by putting the word out that he 
was a difficult client and that no other lawyers would want to afford him a zealous 
defense. He therefore provided testimony that indicated that his guilty plea was not 
given knowingly and voluntarily. 
A guilty plea must be the voluntary expression of the defendant's own 
choice. "[T]he agents of the state may not produce a plea by actual or 
threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the 
defendant." The plea is void if it is "induced by promises or threats which 
deprive it of the nature of a voluntary act." (citations omitted). 
laea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861 (9th Cir., 1986). 
Thus, Mr. Peterson put forth evidence supporting his claims in his petition for 
post conviction belief not only via verification of this petition and via a supporting 
affidavit, but also via testimony. Therefore it is Mr. Peterson's contention that the district 
court improperly summarily dismissed his petition based on incorrect procedure as 
briefed above, and also because the court had before it controverted facts in evidence 
that required findings of fact and conclusions of law, rather than summary disposition. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, Mr. Peterson respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
the district court's order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, and denying his 
motion to reconsider, and remand the matter for further hearings. 
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